This monograph (TCC) analyzes the concept of prote philosophia in Aristotle's Metaphysics in order to infer what the real subject of study of the science that Aristotle intends to ground in this work. To do so, we will try to explain some Aristotelian conceptions of metaphysics as first philosophy analyzing the first causes and the first principles. Aristotle, in book IV, proposes a science that considers the study of being qua being and the properties that belong to it as such, (...) i.e., not particularly, but universally. Nevertheless, since "being" is not an univocal concept, it is necessary to describe the concept of substance (ousia), in books VII–IX and XII, as an inseparable part of being or, in other words, the substance being one being and also the cause of the existence of other beings. Afterwards, we describe the transition from the study of being to the study of substance with the purpose of safeguarding the possibility of a metaphysical science. Undoubtedly, the tasks concerning the investigation of first philosophy as a science are crucial for the study of being qua being insofar as their results explain the structure of reality itself. (shrink)

It seems plausible that successfully communicating with our peers requires entertaining the same thoughts as they do. We argue that this view is incompatible with other, independently plausible principles of thought individuation. Our argument is based on a puzzle inspired by the Kripkean story of Peter and Paderewski: having developed several variations of the original story, we conclude that understanding and communication cannot be modeled as a process of thought transfer between speaker and hearer. While we are not the first (...) to reach this conclusion, the significance of our argument lies in the fact that it only relies on widely accepted premises, without depending on any especially controversial theory of mental and linguistic content. We conclude by drawing out the implications of that conclusion: if communication and understanding do not require thought identity, then one important motivation for the postulation of inter-personally shared thoughts is undercut. (shrink)

Mechanisms play a crucial role in scientific research across various disciplines, and philosophers of science have devoted significant effort into understanding their ontology and epistemology. This paper examines the relationship between mechanisms and phenomena, highlighting the inherent dependence of mechanistic delineation on the characterization of phenomena. By acknowledging that characterizing phenomena is influenced by pragmatic considerations and research interests, the paper argues that mechanistic inquiry is inherently shaped by researchers’ perspectives. This dependence raises concerns about the possibility of a realist (...) view of mechanisms. To address these concerns, the paper explores how top-down constraints, rooted in researchers’ interests and pragmatic concerns, can be balanced by bottom-up constraints derived from empirical considerations. In conclusion, I argue that the interplay between these constraints forms an empirical and realist counterweight to the perspectival nature of top-down constraints. (shrink)

In this paper, I assess whether indexical attitudes, e.g. beliefs and desires, have any special properties or present any special challenge to theories of propositional attitudes. I being by investigating the claim that allegedly problematic indexical cases are just instances of the familiar phenomenon of referential opacity. Regardless of endorsing that claim, I provide an argument to the effect that indexical attitudes do have a special property. My argument relies on the fact that one cannot account for what is it (...) to share someone else’s indexical attitudes without rejecting some plausible thesis about propositional attitudes. In the end, I assess Herman Cappelen and Josh Dever’s considerations on intentional action and extract an argument from them that could – if successful – neutralize my own. I finish by arguing that their argument has an important flaw, thus failing to convince us that indexical attitudes are just as ordinary as any other. (shrink)

I suggest a solution to a conflict between semantic internalism – according to which the concepts one expresses are determined by one's use of representations – and publicity – according to which, if two subjects successfully communicate or are in genuine agreement, then they entertain thoughts constituted by the same concepts. My solution rests on the thesis that there can be successful communication and genuine agreement between thinkers employing distinct concepts as long as there is a certain relation (of conceptually (...) guaranteed sameness of extension) between them. In section 2, I motivate semantic internalism and show how it conflicts with publicity. In section 3, I carve the logical space of possible solutions to the conflict into liberal and conservative solutions. Section 4 assesses Wikforss's conservative solution to Burge's arthritis thought‐experiment and concludes that it fails for more than one reason. Section 5 introduces a new case study involving a deferential concept. This case serves as the backdrop for my positive account offered in section 6. The conclusion of the article is preceded by a comparison of my view with another recently proposed by Recanati (section 7) and some replies to possible objections (section 8). (shrink)

Este artigo visa compreender o estado da arte do naturalismo contemporâneo a partir da discussão com posições não naturalistas, em especial as de Moore e Rawls. Parte-se da análise do argumento central destas abordagens no contexto formal da metaética contemporânea, buscando aferir a validade da falácia naturalista no contexto atual, bem como de seus limites na aplicação contra o naturalismo moral. Apresenta-se a discussão entre o naturalismo e o não-naturalismo moral como, respectivamente, estandartes das perspectivas descritivas e prescritivas da moralidade. (...) O objetivo com esta comparação é apresentar algumas posições em metaética a fim de melhor entender a situação contemporânea do debate moral no que tange à naturalização da ética, contrastando teorias da ação e do valor quanto ao tema da motivação e da normatividade morais. (shrink)

I discuss a criterion for successful communication between a speaker and a hearer put forward by Buchanan according to which there is communicative success only if the hearer entertains, as a result of interpreting the speaker's utterance, a thought that has the same truth conditions as the thought asserted by the speaker and, furthermore, does so in virtue of recognizing the speaker's communicative intentions. I argue, against Buchanan, that the data on which it is based are compatible with a view (...) involving Fregean modes of presentation. In the second part of the article I critically discuss Unnsteinsson's claim that communicative success depends on the absence of contextually salient false distinctness beliefs about the subject matter of the conversation. I argue that this thesis leads to clearly counterintuitive consequences and that no fundamental role must be given to the presence or absence of false distinctness beliefs in one's account of successful communication. The upshot is that we should stick with Buchanan's criterion. I conclude by employing Strawson and Recanati's concepts of linking and merging to show how the criterion I favour is compatible with the fact that, when subjects hold no relevant false distinctness beliefs, communicative success does not seem to be disrupted by the hearer seemingly failing to recognize the speaker's intentions. (shrink)

Focusing on Deleuze´s concept of becoming and on the way it embraces difference in the genesis of literary writing, we intend to put in dialogue the concept and the philosopher with the post-colonial criticism and its re-articulation of the subaltern´s issue, to make a reinterpretation of the becoming and its variations – becoming-woman, becoming-minor – for cultural and literary analysis.

This work offers an analysis of all the legal and moral issues surrounding humanitarian intervention: the deaths of innocent persons and the Doctrine of Double Effect Governmental legitimacy - The Doctrine of Effective Political Control; UN Charter and evaluation of the Nicaragua ruling; The Morality of not intervening; US-led invasion of Iraq; Humanitarian intervention authorised by the UN Security Council - Iraq, Somalia, Haiti, Rwanda, and Bosnia among others highlight NATO's intervention in Kosovo; The Nicaragua Decision; and The precedents of (...) Panama, Liberia and Sierra Leone. The book's features include: a new framework based on the doctrine of double effect; basic principles of international ethics; outline of the moral argument for humanitarian intervention; explores the morality and legality of military action to end tyranny or anarchy; arguments in a much more detailed and complete fashion than in previous editions; in-depth examination of philosophy of international law; the relationship between custom and moral theory; new discussion of the question of right authority; and a full analysis of recent interventions in Kosovo and Iraq. book addresses a broad interdisciplinary audience of international lawyers, philosophers, and political scientists. In this new edition, the author responds to critics while updating the discussion in the light of the momentous events that took place at the beginning of the new millennium. (shrink)

Traditionally, philosophers consider the question of whether episodic memory and imagination belong to the same kind (the (dis)continuism problem) as ultimately depending on the causality question - i.e., whether remembering requires a causal connection to the past event. In this framework, if memory is a simulation process (as claimed by simulationism) and does not require a causal connection, then it is sufficiently similar to imagination and, thus, continuism follows. On the other hand, if a causal connection is necessary for memory (...) (as defended by causalism), then there are fundamental differences between memory and imagination and, thus, discontinuism follows. In contrast with this framework, I will argue that such entanglement is due to a failure of clearly delineating issues of explanation and classification. By distinguishing these matters more explicitly, I conclude that continuism is the better alternative for classification purposes, while maintaining that causalism is still necessary for explaining how memory works. (shrink)

The study aimed to comprehensively overview the experiences encountered by public school employees during the recruitment, selection, and placement (RSP) process within the DepEd Bohol Division. Employing a qualitative-descriptive research design, the researchers utilized a phenomenological approach to delve deeply into these experiences, shedding light on the nuances and intricacies of the division's RSP process. As Lambert et al. (2013) described, qualitative- descriptive studies aim to provide a comprehensive and detailed summary of specific events experienced by individuals or groups in (...) everyday terms. To achieve this, Colaizzi's (1978) data analysis method was applied, meticulously gathering, transcribing, and analyzing recorded participant responses. The rigorous analysis revealed that an overwhelming 81% of the participants recognized significant challenges within the current RSP system of the division, underscoring the pressing need for a renewed approach to address these identified challenges. This highlighted the necessity for an RSP policy that is responsive and innovative, tailored to meet the evolving needs and expectations of applicants, schools, and the division. By implementing improvements to the RSP process, a more efficient and timely filling of vacated and newly available positions is anticipated, contributing to the seamless functioning of the educational system and ultimately enhancing the prospects of success. (shrink)

Given both the phenomenological and cognitive similarities between episodic memory and imagination, it’s difficult to say how we can reliably distinguish them at their moment of retrieval. Several memory markers have thus been proposed, which are characteristics that would reliably indicate to the subject that her mental state is an instance of memory. While the question of what exactly constitutes these memory markers is still an issue to be settled, there is also the more general question of whether they can (...) be reliable at all. In the present paper, I have identified two theses about the latter issue (the reliability and unreliability theses) and have argued that the main cause of disagreement between them lies on their different assumptions on how beliefs about our own mental states are formed, i.e. what are the underlying metacognitive mechanisms responsible for self-attribution of mental states. These different views on metacognition were then further investigated with regards to their use of metarepresentations and their general agreement with recent cognitive psychology research. These analyses corroborate the reliability of certain kinds of memory markers in distinguishing between memory and imagination. (shrink)

Today’s philosophers of memory are split between continuists, who claim that episodic memory (EM) and imagination (EI) belong to the same natural kind, and discontinuists, who defend that they don’t. This abstract considers how assumptions about which mechanisms are relevant for natural kindness shape this discussion. If the argument is in the right track, the (dis)continuism debate should be characterized as a verbal dispute about the important mechanisms for EM and EI.

No presente artigo, constata-se o modo como o ensino de filosofia no Brasil, visto como educação maior, é utilizado como ferramenta da inculcação de um arbitrário cultural a partir de uma análise bourdieuana do sistema de ensino. Chegou-se à conclusão que a prioridade conferida ao texto clássico de filosofia no ensino médio é um modo de reprodução das mesmas estruturas sociais que permitem a impossibilidade de ascensão social. Com isso, é proposta uma educação menor, cuja constituição fundamental é a relação (...) entre professor e aluno, capaz de subverter as características da educação maior. Para tanto, foram analisados os textos de Sílvio Gallo (2002; 2006), os quais apontam para a valorização do capital cultural dos alunos, o incentivo à criação autônoma de conceitos e escolha de autoras e autores não canônicos como ferramentas de subversão dos mecanismos da educação maior. (shrink)

The aim of the present paper is to show that presentism cannot answer the truthmaker objection in a satisfactory manner. For such, two main categories of presentist solutions were studied: the first kind states that truthmakers can’t provide any objection to presentism, while the second type tries to ground past truths by postulating new ontological categories, which were rejected, mainly because of their use of ad hoc ontologies. Also, I showed how the presentist should adopt antirealism about the past in (...) case she wants to maintain a simple ontology. Being that said, I conclude that presentism cannot offer satisfactory truthmakers to past truths. (shrink)

This electronic document serves as a guide on how to get a LAMP stack running on a Google Compute Engine virtual machine instance running Debian.

This paper aims to undertake an examination of the exposition made in the aristotelian treatise De Incessu Animalium about the directional orientations (above and below, right and left, front and behind) mostly from its extra, inter and intratextual context. These directional orientations seem to be directly related to the principles of movement, perception and growing. The treatise starts from the points of origin (archai) of these functions in the animals and, from these functions, distinguish them. Therefore, functionality is established as (...) the first value, because it is the prism through which Aristotle perceives and think the right, above and front in the animals. On that account, it is corroborated the great importance of functionality in the aristotelian philosophy. Afterwards, it will be searched if (or how) the primacy of the trinominal formed by right, above and front is related to aspects of the greek imaginary contemporaneous with the given text. (shrink)

ICTs, personal data, digital rights, the GDPR, data privacy, online security… these terms, and the concepts behind them, are increasingly common in our lives. Some of us may be familiar with them, but others are less aware of the growing role of ICTs and data in our lives - and the potential risks this creates. These risks are even more pronounced for vulnerable groups in society. People can be vulnerable in different, often overlapping, ways, which place them at a disadvantage (...) to the majority of citizens; Table 3 in this guide presents some of the many forms and causes of vulnerability. As a result, vulnerable people need greater support to navigate the digital world, and to ensure that they are able to exercise their rights. This guide explains where such support can be found, and also answers the following questions: - What are the main ethical and legal issues around ICTs for vulnerable citizens? - Who is vulnerable in Europe? - How do issues around ICTs affect vulnerable people in particular? This guide is a resource for members of vulnerable groups, people who work with vulnerable groups, and citizens more broadly. It is also useful for data controllers1 who collect data about vulnerable citizens. While focused on citizens in Europe, it may be of interest to people in other parts of the world. It forms part of the Citizens’ Information Pack produced by the PANELFIT project, and is available in English, French, German, Italian and Spanish. You are welcome to translate this guide into other languages. Please send us a link to online versions in other languages, so that we can add them to the project website. (shrink)

This research tackled the challenges public secondary schools in Sagbayan District, Bohol, faced regarding records management. The study employed a mixed research design, combining both descriptive-qualitative and descriptive- quantitative methods. The qualitative phase involved conducting in-depth interviews and focus group discussions with relevant stakeholders involved in records management. On the other hand, the quantitative phase utilized survey questionnaires to gather data from relevant stakeholders to determine the acceptability of the proposed MIS among end-users. The first phase findings revealed various challenges (...) in records management faced by the schools, such as inefficient manual record-keeping systems, difficulties in data retrieval, and the risk of data loss due to inadequate backup procedures. These challenges highlighted the need for a comprehensive, technology-driven solution to streamline records management processes and ensure data security. The evaluation results in the second phase showed that the developed Management Information System (MIS) was well-accepted among the end users. The absence of any significant difference in the level of acceptability among the participants further validated the system's suitability for addressing their specific needs. The successful implementation of the MIS proved to be an effective solution to the records management challenges faced by the public secondary schools in Sagbayan District, Bohol. (shrink)

Brogaard and Salerno (2008) argued that counter-examples to contraposition, strengthening the antecedent, and hypothetical syllogism involving subjunctive conditionals only seem to work because they involve a contextual fallacy where the context assumed in the premise(s) is illicitly shifted in the conclusion. To avoid such counter-examples they have proposed that the context must remain fixed when evaluating an argument for validity. That is the Brogaard-Salerno Stricture. Tristan Haze (2016), however, has recently objected that intuitively valid argumentative forms such as conjunction introduction (...) do not satisfy this constraint. This paper has two goals. First, it argues that the Brogaard-Salerno Stricture is not violated in Haze’s putative counter-example. Second, it argues that since this stricture blocks the usual counter-examples to instances of classical argumentative forms that involve indicative or subjunctive conditionals, it is reasonable to infer that indicative and subjunctive conditionals are material. (shrink)

We perform an experimental investigation using a dictator game in which individuals must make a moral decision —to give or not to give an amount of money to poor people in the Third World. A questionnaire in which the subjects are asked about the reasons for their decision shows that, at least in this case, moral motivations carry a heavy weight in the decision: the majority of dictators give the money for reasons of a consequentialist nature. Based on the results (...) presented here and of other analogous experiments, we conclude that dicator behavior can be understood in terms of moral distance rather than social distance and that it systematically deviates from the egoism assumption in economic models and game theory. (shrink)

In this paper, I analyse EE I 6, where Aristotle presented a famous methodological digression. Many interpreters have taken this chapter as advocating a dialectical procedure of enquiry. My claim is that Aristotle does not keep a dialectical attitude towards endoxa or phainomena in this chapter. In order to accomplish my goal, I shall show that EE I 6 does not provide enough evidence for the dialectical construal of it, and that this construal, in turn, hangs on some assumptions brought (...) out from other Aristotelian works (EN and Top.), which do not provide good evidence as well. By the analysis of these assumptions, I intend to show that Aristotle is not carrying out any sort of dialectic, especially dialectic conceived as conceptual analysis seeking the salvage of phainomena or endoxa. (shrink)

My aim in this paper is twofold: I will try to clarify what the conditions developed in EN I a discipline or an argument must meet to be assumed as precise are, and, then, try to present evidence that the exam of akrasia in EN VII 3 meets these conditions. In the first part of this paper, I will select passages in which such conditions are displayed, and also distinguish between practical precision and theoretical precision. In the second part, where (...) the analysis of the senses of having but not using knowledge in EN VII 3 is carried on, I will claim that Aristotle’s objective is reaching the adequate statement of the explanandum that will be the subject of causal enquiry of akrasia. My concluding remarks will claim that the conditions displayed in this paper’s first part are met by Aristotelian procedure in EN VII 3. (shrink)

We advance a theory of the representational role of Euclidean diagrams according to which they are samples of co-exact features. We contrast our theory with two other conceptions, the instantial conception and Macbeth’s iconic view, with respect to how well they accommodate three fundamental constraints on theories of the Euclidean diagrammatic practice— that Euclidean diagrams are used in proofs whose results are wholly general, that Euclidean diagrams indicate the co-exact features that the geometer is allowed to infer from them and (...) that Euclidean diagrams play the same role in both direct proofs and indirect proofs by reductio—and argue that our view is the one best suited to account for them. We conclude by illustrating the virtues of our conception of Euclidean diagrams as samples by means of an analysis of Saccheri’s quadrilateral. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is an attempt to delimitate what the dialectical syllogism looks like in Aristotle’s Topics. Aristotle never gave an example of a dialectical syllogism, but we have some clues spread over books I and VIII of the Topics which make it possible to understand at least what within a dialectical debate is a dialectical syllogism. The interpretation advanced here distinguishes the logical order of the dialectical argumentation from the order of the debate. This distinction enables us (...) to have a better understand of what is and how the dialectical syllogism is identified in the debate. In addition, we can solve some interpretative difficulties other interpretations could not solve, and have a more solid grasp of how endoxa are used in a dialectical debate. (shrink)

En este artículo presentamos las principales corrientes de la Filosofía Experimental y atendemos a una de las críticas más severas a la que se ha sometido este reciente programa de renovación metodológica. Según Antti Kauppinen la Filosofía Experimental está condenada al fracaso porque no puede obtener mediante sus métodos el tipo de intuiciones que interesan a los filósofos –las intuiciones robustas del hablante competente. Aun aceptando parte de las críticas de Kauppinen, en este artículo sostenemos, en primer lugar, que la (...) supuesta incapacidad de la Filosofía Experimental para acceder a las intuiciones robustas de los hablantes tiene que ver en gran medida con los métodos experimentales empleados hasta ahora por los filósofos experimentales. En segundo lugar, defendemos que el proyecto de reforma llevado a cabo desde la Filosofía Experimental resultará viable solo si se adoptan una serie de consejos metodológicos procedentes de la economía experimental. Únicamente entonces podrán los experimentalistas responder con éxito a la objeción de Kauppinen. (shrink)

This article aims to understand the views of three prominent figures in existential literature and philosophy: Albert Camus, Søren Kierkegaard, and Fyodor Dostoevsky. The analysis focuses on exploring and explaining fundamental concepts of their philosophies, such as morality, the meaning of life, and the relationship with the divine, in order to establish a dialogue among these three authors. The underlying thread connecting these thinkers is the Socratic figure of speech, irony. Through the examination of contradictions and ironic elements present in (...) their works, the article highlights the significance of irony as a central core in their ideas, encompassing both academic discourse and the realms of literature and symbolism. The comparative method employed goes beyond contrasts, also emphasizing points of contact between the ideas expressed through the stages of existence and the personalities of the protagonists in their novels. The initial sections for each author introduce the basic concepts for general understanding. Subsequently, the main ideas are explored through analysis of their masterpieces, leading to a comparative dialogue among them. Contrasts involve the perspectives embodied by characters like Alyosha Karamazov, Meursault, and Zosima, showcasing the authors' opinions, reflecting the zeitgeist, and highlighting their divergences, ultimately providing a comprehensive view of how they influenced and criticized each other within the philosophical tradition. (shrink)

This article aims to understand the views of three prominent figures in existential literature and philosophy: Albert Camus, Søren Kierkegaard, and Fyodor Dostoevsky. The analysis focuses on exploring and explaining fundamental concepts of their philosophies, such as morality, the meaning of life, and the relationship with the divine, in order to establish a dialogue among these three authors. The underlying thread connecting these thinkers is the Socratic figure of speech, irony. Through the examination of contradictions and ironic elements present in (...) their works, the article highlights the significance of irony as a central core in their ideas, encompassing both academic discourse and the realms of literature and symbolism. The comparative method employed goes beyond contrasts, also emphasizing points of contact between the ideas expressed through the stages of existence and the personalities of the protagonists in their novels. The initial sections for each author introduce the basic concepts for general understanding. Subsequently, the main ideas are explored through analysis of their masterpieces, leading to a comparative dialogue among them. Contrasts involve the perspectives embodied by characters like Alyosha Karamazov, Meursault, and Zosima, showcasing the authors' opinions, reflecting the zeitgeist, and highlighting their divergences, ultimately providing a comprehensive view of how they influenced and criticized each other within the philosophical tradition. (shrink)

It is usually accepted that deductions are non-informative and monotonic, inductions are informative and nonmonotonic, abductions create hypotheses but are epistemically irrelevant, and both deductions and inductions can’t provide new insights. In this article, I attempt to provide a more cohesive view of the subject with the following hypotheses: (1) the paradigmatic examples of deductions, such as modus ponens and hypothetical syllogism, are not inferential forms, but coherence requirements for inferences; (2) since any reasoner aims to be coherent, any inference (...) must be deductive; (3) a coherent inference is an intuitive process where the premises should be taken as sufficient evidence for the conclusion, which on its turn should be viewed as necessary evidence for the premises in some modal range; (4) inductions, properly understood, are abductions, but there are no abductions beyond the fact that in any inference the conclusion should be regarded as necessary evidence for the premises; (5) monotonicity is not only compatible with the retraction of past inferences given new information, but it is a requirement for it; (6) this explanation of inferences holds true for discovery processes, predictions and trivial inferences. (shrink)

According to the so-called ‘standard theory’ of conditions, the conditionship relation is converse, that is, if A is a sufficient condition for B, B is a necessary condition for A. This theory faces well-known counterexamples that appeal to both causal and other asymmetric considerations. I show that these counterexamples lose their plausibility once we clarify two key components of the standard theory: that to satisfy a condition is to instantiate a property, and that what is usually called ‘conditionship relation’ is (...) an inferential relation. Throughout the paper this way of interpreting the standard theory is compared favourably over an alternative interpretation that is outlined in causal terms, since it can be applied to all counterexamples without losing its intuitive appeal. (shrink)

Russell’s role in the controversy about the paradoxes of material implication is usually presented as a tale of how even the greatest minds can fall prey to basic conceptual confusions. Quine accused him of making a silly mistake in Principia Mathematica. He interpreted “if- then” as a version of “implies” and called it material implication. Quine’s accusation is that this decision involved a use-mention fallacy because the antecedent and consequent of “if-then” are used instead of being mentioned as the premise (...) and the conclusion of an implication relation. It was his opinion that the criticisms and alternatives to the material implication presented by C. I. Lewis and others would never be made in the first place if Russell simply called the Philonian construction “material conditional” instead of “material implication”. Quine’s interpretation of the topic became hugely influential if not universally accepted. This paper will present the following criticisms against this interpretation: (1) the notion of material implication does not involve a use-mention fallacy, since the components of “if-then” are mentioned and not used; (2) Quine’s belief that the components of “if-then” are used was motivated by a conditional-assertion view of conditionals that is widely controversial and faces numerous difficulties; (3) if anything, it was Quine who could be accused of fallacious reasoning: he ignored that in the assertion of a conditional is the whole proposition that is asserted and not its constituents; (4) the Philonian construction remains counter-intuitive even if it is called “material conditional”; (5) the Philonian construction is more plausible when it is interpreted as a material implication. (shrink)

This paper advances the following criticisms against the received view of implicatures: (1) implicatures are relations of pragmatic implication and not attempts to convey particular speaker meanings; (2) conversational implicatures are non-cancellable; (3) generalised conversational implicatures and conventional implicatures are necessary to preserve the cooperative assumption employing a conversational maxim of conveyability; (4) implicatures should be divided into utterance implicatures and assumption implicatures, not speaker implicatures and sentence implicatures; (5) trivial implicatures are genuine implicatures; (6) Grice’s theory of conversation cannot (...) explain most of his examples of particularised conversational implicatures; (7) the apparent attempts of explicit cancellation of implicatures are apologies, not attempts to avoid misunderstandings. (shrink)

There is a profound, but frequently ignored relationship between logical consequence (formal implication) and material implication. The first repeats the patterns of the latter, but with a wider modal reach. It is argued that this kinship between formal and material implication simply means that they express the same kind of implication, but differ in scope. Formal implication is unrestricted material implication. This apparently innocuous observation has some significant corollaries: (1) conditionals are not connectives, but arguments; (2) the traditional examples of (...) valid argumentative forms are metalogical principles that express the properties of logical consequence; (3) formal logic is not a useful guide to detect valid arguments in the real world; (4) it is incoherent to propose alternatives to the material implication while accepting the classical properties of formal implication; (5) some of the counter-examples to classical argumentative forms and known conditional puzzles are unsound. (shrink)

The material account proposes that indicative conditionals are material, but it is widely believed that this account cannot be applied to subjunctive conditionals. There are three reasons for this consensus: (1) the concern that most subjunctive conditionals would be vacuously true if they were material, which seems implausible; (2) the inconsistency with Adams pair, which suggests that indicative and subjunctive conditionals have different truth conditions; and (3) the belief that the possible world theories are a superior alternative to the material (...) account. In this paper, I will argue against (1) by showing that the counterintuitive aspects of vacuously true conditionals can be explained away in a consistent manner, regardless of whether they are indicative or subjunctive. I will support this argument by demonstrating that the positive arguments for the material account of indicatives also apply to subjunctives. I will counter (2) by explaining the Adams pair as logically equivalent conditionals that may be appropriate at different times, depending on the speaker’s epistemic situation. Finally, I will challenge (3) by arguing that the possible world account faces insurmountable issues and that a comprehensive material account of both indicatives and subjunctives is ultimately a more elegant solution. (shrink)

En el marco del V Congreso Internacional «La actualidad de Michel Foucault» celebrado en la Universidad Complutense de Madrid entre el 6 y el 8 de marzo de 2018, sostuvimos una interesante conversación con Daniel Lorenzini, investigador del pensamiento ético y político de Michel Foucault y editor de varios de sus cursos y conferencias publicadas en los últimos años en Francia. Discutimos sobre el estado actual de los archivos de Foucault adquiridos por la Biblioteca Nacional de Francia (BnF), algunos de (...) los diversos proyectos editoriales que se derivan del trabajo de archivo y análisis de los manuscritos del filósofo, la reciente e inesperada publicación de Les aveux de la chair y su relación con el proyecto de la Historia de la sexualidad tal como fue planteado en 1976, la relación de Foucault con Nietzsche respecto a sus lecturas de la subjetivación y el vínculo, no siempre evidente, entre ética y política a la luz de sus investigaciones sobre el filósofo francés. (shrink)

The material account of indicative conditionals faces a legion of counterexamples that are the bread and butter in any entry about the subject. For this reason, the material account is widely unpopular among conditional experts. I will argue that this consensus was not built on solid foundations, since these counterexamples are contextual fallacies. They ignore a basic tenet of semantics according to which when evaluating arguments for validity we need to maintain the context constant, otherwise any argumentative form can be (...) rendered invalid. If we maintain the context fixed, the counterexamples to the material account are disarmed. Throughout the paper I also consider the ramifications of this defence, make suggestions to prevent contextual fallacies, and anticipate some possible misunderstandings and objections. (shrink)

It is commonly accepted that unconditional statements are clearer and less problematic than conditional ones. This article challenges this belief by proposing that all unconditional statements can be reduced to conditional ones since epistemic justification is inherently conditional in nature. The distinction between unconditional and conditional statements is similar to the distinction between assumptions and premises, which is an idealization that results from our attempts to limit epistemic complexity. This has perplexing consequences: (1) since any ordinary statement can be viewed (...) as a disguised conditional, this sets off a chain of epistemic regress that results in a larger conditional that encompasses our entire belief systems; (2) this monster conditional can’t never be justified since it always expands in the process of justification; (3) since there is no such thing as unconditional statements, conditionals themselves become meaningless, which implies that arguments and even entire belief systems become meaningless as well; (4) the only way to avoid these disastrous results is to admit that the meaning of conditionals and, ultimately, of our belief systems is a matter of convention. (shrink)

The prevailing viewpoint concerning conditionals asserts two claims: (1) conditionals featuring non-assertive acts in their consequents, such as commands and promises, cannot plausibly be construed as assertions of material implication; (2) the most promising hypothesis for such sentences is conditional-assertion theory, which defines a conditional as a conditional speech act, i.e., the performance of a speech act given the assumption of the antecedent. This hypothesis carries significant and far-reaching implications, as conditional speech acts are not synonymous with a proposition possessing (...) truth conditions. This paper opposes such a view in two steps. Firstly, it presents a battery of objections against conditional-assertion theory. Secondly, it advances the argument that such examples can indeed be convincingly construed as assertions of material implication. (shrink)

The article explores critical elements to understand how Origen elaborates his mystical theology in his Commentary on John. The spiritual progress process implies that rational beings are guided, by God’s Logos, from the practical life to the theoretical one becoming son or daughter of God, in the likeness of the Logos. This process aims at knowing the Father as he is known by the Logos. The article has two parts: 1. The Father’s presence, through the Logos, in rational beings, and (...) 2. a brief characterisation of the salvation, particularly in the perspective of the mediation by the Son of God. (shrink)

Different logic systems are motivated by attempts to fix the counter-intuitive instances of classical argumentative forms, e.g., strengthening of the antecedent, contraposition and conditional negation. These counter-examples are regarded as evidence that classical logic should be rejected in favour of a new logic system in which these argumentative forms are considered invalid. It is argued that these logical revisions are ad hoc, because those controversial argumentative forms are implied by other argumentative forms we want to keep. It is impossible to (...) remove an argumentative form from a logical system without getting entangled in an intricate logical web, since these revisions imply the removal of other parts of a system we want to maintain. Consequently, these revisions are incoherent and unwarranted. At the very least, the usual approach in the analysis of counter-examples of argumentative forms must be seriously reconsidered. (shrink)

There is almost a consensus among conditional experts that indicative conditionals are not material. Their thought hinges on the idea that if indicative conditionals were material, A → B could be vacuously true when A is false, even if B would be false in a context where A is true. But since this consequence is implausible, the material account is usually regarded as false. It is argued that this point of view is motivated by the grammatical form of conditional sentences (...) and the symbols used to represent their logical form, which misleadingly suggest a one-way inferential direction from A to B. That conditional sentences mislead us into a directionality bias is a phenomenon that is well-documented in the literature about conditional reasoning. It is argued that this directional appearance is deceptive and does not reflect the underlying truth conditions of conditional sentences. This directional bias is responsible for both the unpopularity of the material account of conditionals and some of the main alternative principles and themes in conditional theory, including the Ramsey’s test, the Equation, Adams’ thesis, conditional-assertion and possible world theories. The directional mindset forgets a hard- earned lesson that made classical logic possible in the first place, namely, that grammatical form of sentences can mislead us about its truth conditions. There is a case to be made for a material account of indicative conditionals when we break the domination of words over the human mind. (shrink)

Adam Rieger (2013) has carried out a survey of arguments in favour of the material account of indicative conditionals. These arguments involve simple and direct demonstrations of the material account. I extend the survey with new arguments and clarify the logical connections among them. I also show that the main counter-examples against these arguments are not successful either because their premises are just as counter-intuitive as the conclusions, or because they depend on contextual fallacies. The conclusion is that the unpopularity (...) of the material account is unjustified and that a more systematic approach in the analysis of arguments is long overdue in our attempts to understand the nature of conditionals. (shrink)

It seems that the most common strategy to solve the liar paradox is to argue that liar sentences are meaningless and, consequently, truth-valueless. The other main option that has grown in recent years is the dialetheist view that treats liar sentences as meaningful, truth-apt and true. In this paper I will offer a new approach that does not belong in either camp. I hope to show that liar sentences can be interpreted as meaningful, truth-apt and false, but without engendering any (...) contradiction. This seemingly impossible task can be accomplished once the semantic structure of the liar sentence is unpacked by a quantified analysis. The paper will be divided in two sections. In the first section, I present the independent reasons that motivate the quantificational strategy and how it works in the liar sentence. In the second section, I explain how this quantificational analysis allows us to explain the truth teller sentence and a counter-example advanced against truthmaker maximalism, and deal with some potential objections. (shrink)

Intensional evidence is any reason to accept a proposition that is not the truth values of the proposition accepted or, if it is a complex proposition, is not the truth values of its propositional contents. Extensional evidence is non-intensional evidence. Someone can accept a complex proposition, but deny its logical consequences when her acceptance is based on intensional evidence, while the logical consequences of the proposition presuppose the acceptance of extensional evidence, e.g., she can refuse the logical consequence of a (...) proposition she accepts because she doesn’t know what are the truth-values of its propositional contents. This tension motivates counterexamples to the negation of conditionals, the propositional analysis of conditionals, hypothetical syllogism, contraposition and or-to-if. It is argued that these counterexamples are non-starters because they rely on a mix of intensionally based premises and extensionally based conclusions. Instead, a genuine counterexample to classical argumentative forms should present circumstances where an intuitively true and extensionally based premise leads to an intuitively false conclusion that is also extensionally based. The other point is that evidentiary concerns about intensionally based beliefs should be constrained by the truth conditions of propositions presented by classical logic, which are nothing more than requirements of coherence in distributions of truth value. It is argued that this restriction also dissolves some known puzzles such as conditional stand-offs, the Adams pair, the opt-out property and the burglar’s puzzle. (shrink)

Four intuitions are recurrent and influential in theories about conditionals: the Ramsey’s test, the Adams’ Thesis, the Equation, and the robustness requirement. For simplicity’s sake, I call these intuitions ‘the big four’. My aim is to show that: (1) the big four are interdependent; (2) they express our inferential dispositions to employ a conditional on a modus ponens; (3) the disposition to employ conditionals on a modus ponens doesn’t have the epistemic significance that is usually attributed to it, since the (...) acceptability or truth conditions of a conditional is not necessarily associated with its employability on a modus ponens. (shrink)